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Summary 
  
  In this chapter I consider some dilemmatic tensions within contemporary 
attempts to (re)brand Britain a “multicultural society”. I start out by considering two 
political speeches in which Labour Party ministers associated British Multiculturalism 
with the general liberal values of social inclusion, tolerance, human rights, 
progressive change and cosmopolitan moral and political sensibility.  Analysis of the 
text of these speeches reveals tensions within these arguments. First, the rhetorical 
formulations that the speakers used to justify the political project of British 
Multiculturalism tacitly presupposed a natural order in which nations are normally 
populated by a racially and culturally homogenous folk. Second, British 
Multiculturalism is presented as a form of brand distinctiveness, differentiating the 
United Kingdom from other polities, and endowing the British state with commercial 
and military advantage in the international arena. Finally, far from constituting a post-
Anglocentric, post-colonial re-formulation of national identity, the specific narratives 
used to legitimate the construct of British Multiculturalism closely echo the discursive 
tropes previously used to promote British Imperialism.  
 
Contesting the Categories of Nation, Citizenship and Ethnicity 
 The categories of nation and nationalism, race and racism, culture, ethnicity, 
and citizenship constitute essential components of political debate in contemporary 
Western democracies. Despite, or perhaps due to, the commonplace nature of these 
concepts, they are liable to be interpreted in a variety of ways.  Conceptual fuzziness 
may facilitate flexibility and enhance accuracy in everyday reasoning (e.g. Jucker, 
Smith & Ludge, 2003). However, vague concepts are typically treated as anathema to 
rigorous social scientific practice.  Consequently, it is common for social scientists to 
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attempt to clarify the distinction between nationality and citizenship (e.g. Connor, 
1978; Walby, 2003; McCrone & Kiely, 2000), and to propose typologies of ways in 
which the constructs of nation and State may be related to categories of race, culture 
and ethnicity. The most common form of classification distinguishes between 
“exclusive”2 ethnic formulations (according to which nationality or citizenship status 
are determined by descent) and “inclusive” civic formulations (in which nationality 
and citizenship are construed as racially neutral)3.  The assumption that ethnic and 
civic constructions constitute “rival” versions of social and political membership 
(Máiz, 2003) in turn informs research which seeks to classify either bureaucratic 
procedures (e.g. Brubaker, 1992; Greenfield, 1992) or individual social actors in 
terms of their endorsement of particular criteria for the ascription of national identity 
or citizenship (for examples from a UK context. see Bond, 2006; Kiely, Bechhofer & 
McCrone, 2005; McCrone & Bechhofer, 2008; Tilley, Exley & Heath, 2004).   
 Of course, the practice of establishing academic definitions, distinctions or 
typologies does not result in harmonious agreement. On the contrary, academics are 
inclined to treat any proposed lexical or classificatory scheme as the subject of further 
contestation. For example, the idea that nationhood and citizenship can ever in 
practice be distinguished from the constructs of race and ethnicity has been 
                                                        2 Although it has become conventional to equate ethnic formulations with exclusiveness and civic 
formulations with inclusiveness, this is also open to debate (see, e.g. Gans, 2003; Yack, 1999). Morris 
(1996), for example, argued that “cultures of descent” have the potential to be inherently pluralistic in 
so far as membership is not contingent upon an individual’s acceptance on the part of any particular 
practices or institutions but is “vouchsafed by ancestry alone”.  3 In their turn, the precise meaning of the terms “ethnic” and “civic” are highly debateable (Eriksen, 
1993; Thomas, 1999). For example, within assimilationist models of citizenship (of which public 
discourses in France are often taken to represent an exemplary case, see Bryant, 1997; Favell, 1998) 
the construct of “civic” tends to be treated as synonymous with “cultural”, and the construct of “ethnic” 
is understood to refer merely to the use of ancestral (racial or genetic) criteria to determine citizenship. 
In contrast, multiculturalist models of citizenship often presume that “civic” polities are both racially 
and culturally neutral. In such cases, the construct of “ethnic” nationalism is understood to embrace 
situations in which citizenship status is contingent upon the adoption of particular cultural practices 
(Kymlicka, 1995; cf. Alexander, 2002; Barker, 1981).   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questioned by those like Gilroy (1987, p. 56) who argued that the construct of 
nationhood is “saturated with racial connotations”, and Goldberg (2002, p. 11) who 
argued that the formation of contemporary liberal States was “racially predicated”.  
Similarly, attempts to classify forms of nationalism or citizenship into civic and ethnic 
varieties have been questioned on various grounds (e.g. Calhoun, 1999; Thomas, 
2002).  
 In this chapter, I shall consider how a dualistic model, which pits “inclusive” 
versus “exclusive” forms of national representation, can be employed rhetorically to 
manage the tension between national-specific political practices and general liberal 
frames of political reference (cf. Beiner, 2003). Specifically, I will focus on how the 
distinction between ethnic and civic forms of citizenship may be mobilsed by UK 
politicians in their attempts to brand Britain as an essentially, and distinctively, 
multicultural society. 
 
British identity as an essentially contested construct  
  In his monograph, Banal Nationalism, Billig (1995) argued that appeals to 
British identity in the mass media and political rhetoric illustrated the status of the 
construct of British society as “a topos beyond argumentation”.  However, whilst at 
the time that Billig was writing some politicians and some sections of the media may 
have been inclined to treat the category as if it were unproblematic, in fact the 
meaning and legitimacy of the term “British” has always constituted the subject of 
social and political contestation (Cohen, 1994; Davies, 1999; Samuel, 1998).   Since 
the publication of Banal Nationalism, a number of explicit public debates have taken 
place concerning the most appropriate way in which to represent British society, 
identity and polity. In England, these debates have tended to centre on issues relating 
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to immigration, race relations and multiculturalism (e.g. Alibhai Brown, 2000; Parekh 
2000a, 2000b; cf. Fortier, 2005). However, the British identity problematic is also 
regularly raised in relation to European Union membership (e.g. Redwood, 1999) and 
devolved governance (see Bechhofer & McCrone, 2009).  Consequently, far from 
constituting an unambiguous category of discourse, the term British might – like 
nation, citizenship and ethnicity – be better understood as an example of what Gallie 
(1956) termed an essentially contested construct, characterized by continual disputes 
about its proper use, which are not settled by “appeal to empirical evidence, linguistic 
usage, or the canons of logic alone” (Gray, 1978, p. 344).   
 Cultural theorists regularly distinguish two competing versions of British 
identity, reflecting the ideal types of ethno-cultural nationalism and civic citizenship:  
 
 One is Anglo-centric, frequently conservative, backward-looking, and  
  increasingly located in a frozen and largely stereotyped idea of the national  
  culture. The other is ex-centric, open-ended, and multi-ethnic. (Chambers,  
  1989 p. 94).  
 
In this chapter I consider some of the strategies used by members of the Liberal-Left 
political elite to promote a supposedly progressive, ex-centric, multi-ethnic image of 
British society in contrast to a supposedly conservative, Anglo-centric, mono-ethnic 
alternative.  I shall suggest that although these two versions of British identity are 
treated as antithetical, in practice, attempts to (re)brand Britain as a multicultural 
society can tacitly rely upon the very values of ethnic, insular, nationalism that the 
speaker purports to be rejecting. 
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Ideological dilemmas in political reasoning 
 In considering the implicit counter themes apparent in formal appeals to British 
multiculturalism, I shall be employing the social psychological construct of 
ideological dilemmas (Billig et al., 1988). Developed from Billig’s (1987, 1991) 
rhetorical approach to the process of thinking and attitude formulation, the ideological 
dilemmas perspective emphasizes how both formal and common-sense ideologies 
contain contrary, and on occasions explicitly contradictory or dilemmatic, themes.  
These contradictions are not necessarily explicit. Rather, Billig et al. (1988) noted 
how arguments often possess implicitly dilemmatic properties which “can go beyond 
the…intentions of the communicator”, and may include contradictions “contained 
within the semantic structure of the discourse itself” (p.22). By way of 
exemplification, Billig et al. (1988) reported a series of case studies illustrating how 
tensions within liberal ideology (e.g., between the competing values of equality 
versus authority, of individuality versus common human nature) could be identified in 
everyday debates concerning gender, education, prejudice, health and expertise.  
Subsequently, the ideological dilemmas approach has been used to highlight tensions 
within formal and everyday discourses concerning ethnicity, nationality and 
citizenship in contemporary liberal democracies (e.g. Bozatzis, 2009; Condor, 2000; 
2006; 2008; Condor & Gibson, 2007; Sapountzis, 2008).  
 In this chapter I will apply the ideological dilemmas perspective to two formal 
political speeches in which the speaker argues in favour of the idea of Britain as a 
“multicultural society”.  Both of these speeches were delivered by UK Labour Party 
ministers during the first quarter of 2001.  UK politicians regularly deliver speeches 
on the subject of multiculturalism and/or British identity. In the past few years, elite 
perspectives on multiculturalism have become increasingly ambivalent (Joppke, 2004; 
  7 
Parvin, 2009). In contrast, the particular speeches that I shall be considering in this 
chapter involve relatively unequivocal appeals to the fact and value of British 
multiculturalism.  As such, they provide a useful test case (cf. Flyvbjerg, 2004) 
through which to explore conceptual tensions that can lie beneath the rhetorical 
surface of political appeals to the fact and value of multicultural nationality or 
citizenship. 
 The first speech was delivered in February 2001 by Keith Vaz, an Indian-born 
MP, who was at the time was the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office Minister 
of State. This speech was entitled, Citizenship, identity and ethnicity in Britain and 
Europe, and was presented at the Diplomatic Academy, Vienna. The second speech 
was delivered two months later by Robin Cook, who was at the time a Labour MP 
representing the seat of Livingston, and acting as Foreign Secretary. This speech, 
entitled British Identity, was presented to the Centre for the Open Society in London. 
These two speeches were targeted at different audiences and consequently focused on 
rather different issues. However, the ways in which the speakers constructed 
arguments against ethnic, and in favour of multicultural, versions of British identity 
and society shared many features in common, and for present purposes we may deal 
with them together without any significant loss of information. I shall start out by 
briefly outlining the way in which Cook and Vaz formulated their arguments in 
favour of a reconceptualization of Britain as a multicultural society. I shall then go on 
to consider some implicit dilemmatic properties of these arguments. 
     
Arguments in Support of Britain as a “Multicultural Society” 
  
Constructing multiculturalism’s rhetorical Other    
 The first thing to note is that (pace Billig) in neither of these speeches did Vaz 
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or Cook presuppose that the constructs of British society or British identity 
represented topi “beyond argumentation”. On the contrary, both speakers adopted a 
polemical stance, defining their own (and by extension their Party’s and the 
Government’s) brand of British identity precisely in opposition to a putative rival 
construction.  Like Chambers (quoted on page xx above), both Vaz and Cook 
associated the idea of Britain as a “multicultural society” with a cluster of liberal 
symbols such as progressive change, inclusiveness, anti-racism, internationalism and 
support for the EU. In the following extract, for example, we see Vaz equating 
multiculturalism with values of inclusion, fairness and equality:   
Extract  1 (KV) 
  
 1  The British Government’s policies on multiculturalism are clear. We    
 2  see strength and enrichment in diversity. And we believe that one    
 3  of the greatest responsibilities we have is to try to make Britain a    
 4  fairer place; a place where people of every race and religion feel    
 5  themselves to be an equal part of the whole; a society which    
 6  makes a celebration out of the fact that we are multicultural,    
 7  multi-religious and multi-racial; one which not just assimilates    
 8  people but celebrates people’s differences.  
 
  In the course of their speeches, both Vaz and Cook invoked a categorical 
distinction between their own utopian visions and their anti-logoi (Billig, 2003): 
ethnic nationalist versions of British identity and society.  Multiculturalism and ethnic 
understandings of British identity were construed as alternative forms of attitude, 
reliably endorsed by particular individuals and, by implication, the representatives of 
particular political parties4. For example, Vaz presented his own (and the British                                                         4 It is relatively common for the liberal left in the UK to attribute The Conservative Party with the 
stigma of ethnic nationalism (as illustrated by the quotation from Chambers).  However, although 
individual ministers and the main political parties may adopt distinctive positions concerning race, 
immigration and (multi)culture, there nevertheless exists what Favell (1998) has termed a general 
“consensual logic” (p. 103) on the part of the UK political establishment against explicitly racial or 
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Government’s) preferred version of British identity with the views of different people:  
Extract 2 (KV) 
 1  On the issue of identity, there has been quite a bit of debate in Britain   
 2  about just what it means to be British. It is clear that the term embraces  
 3  different things for different people. For some, it is a narrow term    
 4  suggesting white, English and Empire – thus excluding millions of British  
 5  citizens. For others, it conveys a much wider range of images reflecting  
 6  the whole of our society…  
  
  Billig (1989) distinguished between two different ways in which individuals 
may be understood to “hold a view”.  The first, which he termed the “multi-
subjective” position, treats an individual’s (or group’s) views as expressions of 
essentially differing, and possibly idiosyncratic, attitudes.   The second form of 
representation, which Billig termed “intersubjectivity”, presents “views” as pertaining 
to a singular, and ultimately discernable empirical reality, such that agreement 
between perceivers is ultimately possible and ideally desirable.  In the case of the 
stretch of talk presented in extract 2, Vaz is apparently displaying an even-handed 
approach to differences of opinion concerning what it means to be British. However, 
at the outset of his speech he made it clear that the multicultural position did not 
simply represent one point of view amongst many equally legitimate alternatives, but 
rather represented the only position which adequately reflected the objective facts of 
contemporary social reality:  
Extract  3 (KV) 
 1  The first point I would like to get across is that Britain is without    
 2  doubt a multicultural society.   
 
                                                                                                                                                              
cultural definitions of British identity and citizenship.   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  Robin Cook similarly referred to some people who assume the homogeneity of 
British identity … to be the norm (see extract 12, line 2, below), but presented the 
multicultural alternative as a project that the British people in general need to come to 
terms with, not simply because it more accurately reflected the nature of British 
society, but also for pragmatic reasons:  
Extract  4 (RC) 
 1  Coming to terms with multiculturalism as a positive force for our    
 2  economy and society will have significant implications for our    
 3  understanding of Britishness  
  
  More specifically, in so far as Vaz and Cook suggested that their own view of 
Britain as a multicultural society might be at odds with current public opinion, this 
necessarily posed questions of democratic accountability. As Sacks (1992: 1.33) 
noted, in contemporary Western democracies, “one of the characteristics of opinion is 
that it’s something lay people are entitled to have”, that is, in Billig’s terms, there is a 
norm of multi-subjectivity.  In the speeches that I am considering here, Vaz and Cook 
managed the problem of prioritizing their own version of British identity over 
putative rival versions by employing a particular form of discursive psychology (cf. 
Edwards & Potter, 1995).  Notably, both speakers avoided casting debate about 
British identity as a reflection of differing opinions. Rather, the different stances that 
individuals might adopt in this debate were attributed to current differences in 
understanding (cast as varied, unstable, and ultimately resolvable with reference to 
empirical reality).  The psychological category of understanding was, in turn, 
distinguished from the constructs of ideals and values, both of which were invested 
with connotations of consensus and permanence:  
Extract  5 (KV) 
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1  underpinning the word [British] must be a shared understanding    
 2  of core British values such as respect for human rights, tolerance,    
 3  fair play, creativity and an outward approach to the world. This is   
 4  essential to maintain a cohesive and stable society. In general there   
 5  are few conflicts between sharing these values and accepting cultural   
 6  differences.  
  
With respect to my earlier comment concerning the ways in which Vaz and Cook 
linked ethno-cultural understandings of British society with insular nationalism, we 
may note how, in extract 5, Vaz presented core British values not only as compatible 
with an acceptance of domestic cultural differences, but also as necessarily entailing 
an outward approach to the world.   
  In extract 6, Robin Cook employs a slightly different form of argument, 
according to which the current status of Britain as a successful multi-ethnic society is 
attributed to unspecified British values:   
Extract  6 (RC) 
 1  We should be proud that those British values have made Britain    
 2  a successful multi-ethnic society. We should welcome that    
 3  pluralism as a unique asset for Britain in a modern world where    
 4  our prosperity, our security and our influence depend on the health    
 5  of our relations with other peoples around the globe.  
  
Once again we can see how British values are associated not only with the  
endorsement of multiculturalism in the domestic arena, but also with a concern over 
our relations with other peoples around the globe.  
 
Imagining polycultural polity  
 The endorsement of values of cultural diversity might appear to preclude 
appeals to a singular and enduring “national character” (cf. Billig, 1995; Reicher & 
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Hopkins, 2001).  Once again, we may note how Vaz and Cook managed to recover an 
image of a singular national psyche by adopting a particular psychological lexicon. As 
we have seen, they invested values and ideals with the connotations of homogeneity 
and permanence typically associated with the idea of national character. In addition, it 
is interesting to note how both speakers used the term British identity as a substitute 
for references to substantive national culture or character.   
 Vaz and Cook used two additional rhetorical strategies by which to render 
images of a polycultural British society, and multiculturalism as a socio-political 
process, concrete and imaginable.  First, they regularly slipped between the language 
of polity and the idiom of geography, re-presenting British society in non-social 
terms, as the island/s (cf. Abell et al., 2006)5. For example, Vaz (see extract 13, 
below), elided the constructs of British society and island status, and Cook (see 
extract 12, below) employed anthropomorphic imagery to attribute enduring historical 
experience not to the British people but British territory: The diversity of modern 
Britain expressed through devolution and multiculturalism is more consistent with the 
historical experience of our islands.  
  The second strategy involved reifying the construct of culture/s through 
culinary imagery. The capacity for abstract constructs and values to be conveyed 
through images of food has been documented in other contexts, (e.g. Jovchelovitch & 
Gervais, 1999), as has the specific use of culinary imagery in the context of accounts 
of British multiculturalism  (Cook, Crang, & Thorpe, 1999).                                                          5 Vaz’s use of the singular “island” and Cook’s use of the plural “islands” parallels differences in  
formulation in England and Scotland noted by Abell et al (2006). The complexities and contradictions  
that run through political arguments are also evidenced at the more basic level of lexical choice: the  
singular “island” may be regarded as problematic since it omits part of the territory of the UK State. On  
the other hand, the plural “our islands” may be regarded as overly-inclusive, in so far as it is often used  
by people in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland as a reference to the geographical region of  
the British Isles as opposed to the territory of the UK State. Note how the BNP – who generally  
espouse an ideology of national integrity and support policies of intra-UK national self-governance –  
also use the plural form “these islands” (see extracts 17 and 18). 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 In extracts 1 and 2, we saw Keith Vaz argue in favour of a racially and 
culturally inclusive version of Britishness. In the course of working up this account, 
Vaz switched from using the term British as a social or political referent (a society of 
citizens) to relaying images of cultural pluralism through references to cuisine:  
Extract 7 (KV) 
 1       For some, it is a narrow term suggesting white, English and Empire – thus  
 2 excluding millions of British citizens. For others, it conveys a much wider range of  
 3 images  reflecting the whole of our society – not just fish and chips, but also sweet  
 4  and sour pork and chicken tikka masala. In fact, the last dish was    
 5   actually invented in Britain by Indian restaurateurs, but I digress!  
  
Two months later Cook took up Vaz’s digressive narrative concerning chicken tikka 
masala and raised it to exemplificatory status6:   
Extract 8 (RC) 
 1  Chicken Tikka Masala is now a true British national dish, not    
 2  only because it is the most popular, but because it is a perfect    
 3  illustration of the way Britain absorbs and adapts external    
 4  influences. Chicken Tikka is an Indian dish. The Masala sauce    
 5  was added to satisfy the desire of British people to have their meat    
 6  served in gravy.  
 
The uses of history 
  Temporal imagery is often used by elites and by ordinary social actors to 
naturalize national and State boundaries, to establish the value of national culture or 
artifacts (variously through discourses of heritage or progressive narratives of 
change), and to establish positive distinctiveness vis a vis various categories of                                                         6 Vaz’s original reference to chicken tikka masala appears to have been ignored by the news  
media. Cook’s recycling of chicken tikka masala as a metaphor for British cultural hybridity, on the 
other hand, was widely reported – and generally ridiculed - in the media in England. In Scotland, media  
emphasis was more inclined to be placed on the question of whether chicken tikka masala could be  
claimed as a distinctively Scottish invention (Rosie et al., 2004). 
  14 
national Other (Condor, 1997; 2006; Condor & Abell, 2006).  Both Vaz and Cook 
drew heavily on historical narratives when presenting their vision of Multicultural 
Britain, and it is worth considering these accounts in a little detail. 
Multicultural Britain as a brand-update 
 Both Vaz and Cook employed references to time and history to differentiate 
their own multicultural conceptions of British identity from its ethnic nationalist rival. 
For example, Vaz argued that multicultural versions of British identity more 
accurately reflected contemporary, post-imperial, political realities than alternative 
more exclusive formulations:   
Extract  9 (KV) 
 1  the term ‘British’ is not a static one but one that has to take    
 2  account of the changes in our society over the last thirty years,    
 3  including devolution, globalization, the end of Empire and    
 4  Britain’s much closer involvement in Europe. It needs to include    
 5  all our citizens.  
  
  Cook similarly treated ethno-cultural constructions as antithetical to a modern  
notion of national identity:  
Extract  10 (RC) 
  
1  The modern notion of national identity cannot be based on race and    
 2  ethnicity, but must be based on shared ideals and aspirations. Some  
 3  of the most successful countries in the modern world, such as the United  
 4  States and Canada, are immigrant societies. Their experience shows  
 5  how cultural diversity, allied to a shared concept of equal citizenship, can  
 6  be a source of enormous strength.   
  
At the same time, however, Cook used historical imagery to support the argument that 
representations of an indigenous British race or culture had never, in fact, been valid:   
Extract  11 (RC) 
  15 
  
 1  The idea that Britain was a ‘pure’ Anglo-Saxon society before the arrival of  
 2  communities from the Caribbean, Asia and Africa is fantasy. But if  
 3  this view of British identity is false to our past, it is false to our future too.  
 4  The global era has produced population movements of a breadth and    
 5  richness without parallel in history.   
  
Towards the end of his speech, Cook attempted to manage the potential contradiction 
in his line of argument by suggesting that mono-cultural representations of Britishness 
had once been true, but only from the Victorian era of imperial expansion to the 
aftermath of the Second World War, a period that he effectively bracketed from the 
longue duree of British history by labeling this as an extraordinary moment7:  
Extract  12 (RC) 
  
 1  In our thousand years of history, the homogeneity of British    
 2  identity that some people assume to be the norm was confined to a    
 3  relatively brief period. It lasted from the Victorian era of imperial    
 4  expansion to the aftermath of the Second World War and depended    
 5  on the unifying force of those two extraordinary experiences. The    
 6  diversity of modern Britain expressed through devolution and    
 7  multiculturalism is more consistent with the historical experience    
 8  of our islands.  
  
 British ethnic diversification as gradual evolutionary process  
  One common historical formulation often used by ordinary social actors in 
England involves a “narrative of national diversification” (Condor, 2006), according 
to which repeated waves of foreign influence have contributed to an historical process 
through which Britain gradually transformed from an original condition of ethnic 
                                                        7 This kind of historical periodisation - whereby the age of empire and the Second World War are 
separated off from the otherwise ongoing flow of history - tends to be more common among speakers 
from Scotland than England (Condor & Abell, 2006).  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nationhood to a contemporary state of cultural diversity.  In their speeches, both Vaz 
and Cook used this form of historical representation to normalize and to legitimate 
post-colonial immigration.  In extract 13, Vaz describes the ongoing process by which 
British society developed into a nation of island people from diverse origins:  
Extract 13 (KV) 
 1  British society, on the other hand, has been deeply marked by its island  
 2  status of four nations and its history of an overseas rather than a    
 3  continental empire. It has always been a nation of island people from    
 4   diverse origins - by 1066, when we were invaded for the last time by the  
 5  Normans, we had already been subject to invasion and settlement by the  
 6  Romans, Angles, Saxons, Danes, Vikings, and Norse. Immigrants arrived in  
 7  significant numbers from Europe during the late 19th century and in the  
 8  first half of the last century. And after the war, we encouraged immigration  
 9  to Britain from our colonies and former colonies to help rebuild our    
 10  shattered economy. The first group of Jamaicans arrived in 1948 and were  
 11  followed by tens of thousands more, from the Caribbean, India, Pakistan  
 12  and Bangladesh. The 70s and 80s also saw the arrival of the Hong Kong   
 13  Chinese and refugees from Vietnam.  
  
 Robin Cook employed a similar trope when he represented the present condition 
of racial heterogeneity and cultural pluralism as the most recent stage in the open-
ended evolution of British identity:   
 Extract 14 (RC)  
 1  The first element in the debate about the future of Britishness is    
 2  the changing ethnic composition of the British people themselves.    
 3  The British are not a race, but a gathering of countless different    
 4  races and communities, the vast majority of which were not    
 5  indigenous to these islands.  
  
Later in his speech, he extemporized upon this theme:  
Extract 15 (RC) 
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 1  London was first established as the capital of a Celtic Britain by Romans  
 2  from Italy. They were in turn driven out by Saxons and Angles from    
 3  Germany. The great cathedrals of this land were built mostly by Norman  
 4  Bishops, but the religion practiced in them was secured by the succession  
 5  of a Dutch Prince. Outside our Parliament, Richard the Lionheart proudly  
 6   sits astride his steed. A symbol of British courage and defiance. Yet he    
 7   spoke French much of his life and depended on the Jewish community of  
 8   England to put up the ransom that freed him from prison.  
 
British ethnic diversification as ecological crisis   
   In the next section of this chapter I shall be considering some of the tensions,  
oppositional themes and paradoxes that may be identified within Vaz and Cook’s 
arguments in favour of British Multiculturalism. Before we move on, however, it is 
worth noting the capacity for speakers to mobilize similar conventionalized narratives 
to support rival political arguments.  Social psychologists have pointed to the ways in 
which the same propositions may be invoked to support both racist and anti-racist 
arguments (Verkuyten, 1993; Verkuyten de Jong & Masson, 1994). In the case of the 
speeches considered here, we have seen how both Vaz and Cook relied heavily on the 
narrative device of progressive waves of foreign influence to undermine claims 
concerning the ethnic basis of British identity, to naturalize the status of contemporary 
Britain as a multicultural society and to legitimate postcolonial immigration.  It is, 
then, interesting to note that precisely the same narrative could be employed by the far 
right British National Party (BNP) to support a racialized version of British identity, 
to denaturalize multiculturalism and to oppose postcolonial immigration.  
 In a speech entitled The Reality of Race, Nick Griffin (BNP chairman) started 
out by explicitly endorsing an ethno-racial conceptualization of nationality:   
Extract 16 (BNP) 
1   Mankind is divided into races, and those races, while sharing many common   
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2  features of humanity, are innately different in many ways beyond mere colour.  
3   […] The most important first consequence of our acceptance of innate human   
4    differences is our recognition that nationality, while it is influenced by many   
5    factors including shared loyalties, common history, religious heritage and   
6    personal identification is first and foremost decided by ethnicity.   
  
Although in their public rhetoric the BNP maintain a commitment to an ethnic version 
of nationhood, in formal statements BNP spokespeople do not treat indigenous or 
native British peoples as a primordial folk. Rather, BNP ideologues combine the 
“waves of foreign settlement” narrative with a notion of Western Europeans as 
kindred peoples (extract 17, line 7) of almost identical stock (extract 18, line 7)8, to 
present an image of the white British people as a distinctive, hybrid, strain that 
evolved over thousands of years:   
Extract  17 (BNP) 
1  The British National Party exists to secure a future for the      
2  indigenous peoples of these islands in the North Atlantic which have   
3 been our homeland for millennia. We use the term indigenous to   
4  describe the people whose ancestors were the earliest settlers here   
5  after the last great Ice Age and which have been complemented by the historic   
6  migrations from mainland Europe. The migrations of the Celts, Anglo-Saxons,   
7  Danes, Norse and closely related kindred peoples have been, over the past few   
8  thousands years, instrumental in defining the character of our family of nations.  
  BNP Mission Statement (http://www.bnp.org.uk/mission.htm).  
  
Extract 18 (BNP) 
1  Q: When you talk about being "British" what do you mean?   
2  A: We mean the bonds of culture, race, identity and roots of the native British                                                                8 The attribution of the “kindred” nature of the Celts, Anglo-Saxons, Danes, Norse, Romans and 
Normans to their common racial “stock” is spelled out in an article which clarifies the claim that the  
Indigenous British constitute a collectivity of Caucasian peoples originating in Northern and Western  
Europe. See http://www.bnp.org.uk/articles/british_mongrel.htm   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3  peoples of the British Isles. We have lived in these islands near on 40,000 years!   
4   We were made by these islands, and these islands are our home. When we in the  
5   BNP talk about being British, we talk about the native peoples who have lived in     
6   these islands since before the Stone Age, and the relatively small numbers of        
7   peoples of almost identical stock, such as the Saxons, Vikings and Normans, and   
8   the Irish, who have come here and assimilated.   
 BNP website FAQs (http://www.bnp.org.uk).  
 
  The presumption that British culture in general, and British democratic values  
in particular, represent the distinctive historical product of the peoples of Western 
Europe (extract 19, line 3) is used by the BNP as a basis for resisting immigration on 
the part of Central and Eastern Europeans, and people with ancestral origins outside 
Europe, on the grounds that they have genetically pre-determined (line 6) limitations 
to their ability to accommodate European values of democratic citizenship:   
Extract 19 (BNP) 
1  Taking these facts into account, we believe that it is far more likely than not that   
2  the historically established tendency (and we do not claim that it is any more than  
3   that) of the peoples of Western Europe in general - and of these islands in             
4   particular - to create and sustain social and political structures in which individual  
5   freedom, equality before the law, private property and popular participation in       
6   decision-making, is to some extent at least genetically pre-determined. Such         
7  tendencies would, naturally, both shape our culture around such institutions, and   
8   in turn tend to be reinforced by that culture.  
9 If this is the case, then the idea that it is possible to allow large numbers of people  
10  from very different ethnic groups and cultures to settle here, on the assumption   
11  that it is just something about our bracing sea air that tends to make us natural   
12  born democrats, is fatally flawed. Just as is the idea that we can export our         
13  enthusiasm for representative government to other peoples, either by example or  
14  by carpet-bombing their countries into giving up their penchant for strong            
15  government or theocracy.  
16  Hence, in order to guarantee the continued existence of our British democracy, we  
17   also intend to take long-term steps to guarantee the continued existence, as the  
18   clearly dominant ethnic, cultural and political group, of the native peoples of these  
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19  islands – the English, Scots, Irish and Welsh – together with the limited numbers  
20   of peoples of European descent, who arrived as refugees or economic immigrants  
21   centuries or decades ago, and who have fully integrated into our society.   
 (From: Rebuilding British Democracy, BNP General Election Manifesto, 2005).  
  
The Return of the Repressed: Some Dilemmatic Elements of Appeals to “British 
Multiculturalism” 
 In this section of the chapter I turn to consider some tensions within Vaz’s and 
Cook’s attempts to (re)brand Britain as a multicultural society,  and their claims that 
an endorsement of British multiculturalism entails opposition to Anglocentrism, a 
rejection of the “outdated” ideology of ethnic nationalism, and the adoption of an 
outward approach to the world. 
  
Implicit Anglocentrism 
 We have seen how Vaz and Cook – in common with many contemporary  
commentators – treated presumptions of British monoculture as part of an ideological 
package that also included Anglocentrism.  For these speakers, concerns to avoid 
Anglocentric forms of accounting had an immediate political significance in the light 
of recent changes to the UK constitution. In extracts 9 and 12 the speakers made 
passing reference to devolution.  Robin Cook, who represented a constituency in 
Scotland, dedicated a section of his speech to the issue of British identity in relation to 
devolution. Although Keith Vaz did not discuss the issue of devolution at any length, 
he nevertheless acknowledged multi-national as well as poly-ethnic constructions of 
British diversity by his reference to how British society…has been deeply marked by 
its island status of four nations… (extract 13), and by distinguishing his preferred 
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(“inclusive”) representation of British identity from those Other formulations which 
equate the terms British and English (see extract 2).  
However, attention to the details of these accounts reveals how these 
statements of intent were belied by the speakers’ actual rhetorical practice.  In 
particular, we may note that the kinds of historiography that the speakers used to 
naturalise “British” polyculture neglected the different histories of the component 
nations of the UK (cf. Davies, 1999; Kearney, 1989). The UK has only existed in its 
present form since 1922, and the political union between England and Scotland dates 
from 1707. However, both Cook and Vaz took 1066 (the date of the Norman conquest 
of England) as the canonical landmark in the history of Britain. Cook, for example, 
referred to our thousand years of history (extract 12), and Vaz referred explicitly to 
1066, when we were invaded for the last time by the Normans (extract 13). More 
generally, both Vaz and Cook employed Anglocentric historiographies of Britain, 
universalising not only the experience of the Norman Conquest (of England), but also 
the rule of King Richard (of England), and the Roman occupation (of Britannia 
Major, but not of Caledonia)9. In contrast, it is instructive to note how the BNP 
history of our family of nations (reported in extract 17) studiously avoids this form of 
Anglocentric narrative. 
 
Presupposing an ethnic basis to nationhood   
  Although both Vaz and Cook were concerned to resist ethno-cultural 
representations of British society, neither of these speakers challenged ethnic 
nationalism as a general ideological principle. On the contrary, the strategies that Vaz 
                                                        9 A very similar Anglocentric version of the “British” history of immigration was later presented by 
Gordon Brown (2007) in his speech on Britishness, which was much less supportive of the politics of 
multiculturalism (see Lee, 2007). 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and Cook used to promote the fact and value of British multiculturalism presupposed 
a natural order in which nations (and in particular, other European nations) are 
generally populated by an original folk possessing a common ancestral heritage and a 
homogeneous and distinctive culture.  
 The assumption that nations are normally characterized by racial and cultural 
homogeneity constitutes an unstated bridging assumption in Vaz’s and Cook’s 
arguments concerning the importance of non-ethnic understandings of nationhood for 
the modern world, which implicitly presuppose a pre-modern world, in relation to 
which (by implication) ethnic formulations would have been appropriate.   
 In addition, these politicians’ attribution of British racial and cultural pluralism to 
external influence (e.g. extract 21, line 3) in general, and to trans-national migration 
in particular, fails entirely to acknowledge the presence of indigenous cultural 
heterogeneity within the territories of extant or historically emergent nations or States. 
Neither Vaz nor Cook entertained the possibility that the inhabitants of the British 
Isles (or, in extract 10, of Canada or the USA) might have been characterized by 
ethnic diversity before the waves of foreigners arrived at their shores. Similarly, they 
did not entertain the possibility that the European peoples that they cite as cultural 
brokers (Saxons, Danes, Vikings, Norse, etc.) might themselves have been 
characterized by various, or hybrid, cultural forms.  Finally, their presumption that 
different cultures were originally the property of distinctive national peoples 
inhabiting national territories is apparent in their anachronistic application of 
contemporary frames of European geopolitical reference, whereby imperial Rome is 
located in Italy, and the Angles are said to hail from Germany (extract 15).  
 
Limits to the imagination of British polyculture 
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 Although both Cook and Vaz started out by characterizing their arguments as 
attempts to defend and promote the political project of British Multiculturalism, 
analysis of the content of their accounts points to the occurrence of topic drift (Hobbs, 
1990). In practice, the gist of their arguments actually tended to endorse values of 
racial diversity and cultural hybridity. For example, although Vaz prefaced his speech 
with the proclamation, Britain is without doubt a multicultural society (extract 20), 
the specific evidence that he offered to back up this assertion actually involved 
images of racial, rather than cultural, diversity (White, Black, Asian… line 8): 
Extract  20 (KV) 
 
1 The first point I would like to get across is that Britain is without doubt a  
2 multicultural society. This strikes you as soon as you arrive in the UK.  
3 Switch on the television and you will see ethnic minority newsreaders,  
4 political commentators and writers; comedians, soap opera stars and opera   
5  singers; fashion designers and models, footballers and dancers. Watch any   
6  arts programme and you will increasingly find that much of contemporary   
7 British culture is a hybrid, born of the talents creativity and styles of many   
8 different groups – White, Black, Asian and other minorities. The result is a   
9 unique proof of how diversity enriches our society and our lives. 
 
Note also how Vaz also slips between the proposition that Britain is without doubt a 
multi-cultural society in lines 1-2, and the assertion on line 7 that British culture is a 
hybrid.  A similar shift can also be noted in Cook’s account, in which he sought to 
exemplify the construct of British (multi)culture through metaphorical reference to 
the melting pot image of chicken tikka masala.  
This slip between an in-principle insistence on the recognition of polyculture 
for a civic construction of Britishness, to the characterisation of British society in 
terms of a melting pot image of cultural hybridity has two important implications. 
First, this rhetorical move effectively retrieves a presumption of the essential 
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singularity of British culture. Note, for example, the use of the singular in Vaz’s 
statement in extract 20, British culture is a hybrid.  Similarly, although Cook 
explicitly endorsed an image of Anglo British society as a multicultural community of 
communities, in extract 8 he rhetorically juxtaposes the categories of Indian origin 
and British people in such a manner as to imply that the two constructs are mutually 
exclusive. Similarly, in extract 15 the formulation of his account presupposes that the 
Jewish community of twelfth century London was essentially something other than 
English or British. 
Second, the move from emphasising cultural diversity to celebrating cultural 
hybridity enables Vaz and Cook to construct an image of British distinctiveness. In so 
far as Britain’s cultural diversity is understood to result from the practice of importing 
peoples, ideas, languages, goods and lifestyles from other countries, it would follow 
that there may be little to distinguish the particular cultural forms and artefacts 
existing in the UK from those existing in other parts of the globe. References to 
hybridity, in contrast, afford images of British cultural uniqueness: the iconic value of 
chicken tikka masala lies precisely in the fact that it is not also eaten in India. 
 
Polyculture and Multiculturalism as British brand distinctiveness  
 It is a social scientific cliché that all identities – including national identities - 
are constructed vis a vis some category of Other. As Bechhofer and McCrone (2009, 
p.65) recently put it, “Having a sense of who you are in national identity terms 
involving knowing who you are not”. An extensive body of social psychological 
research has considered the general processes involved in distinguishing ingroups 
from outgroups. One early contribution to these debates (Turner, 1975) contrasted the 
process of  “social competition” (distinctions between in- and outgroup formulated 
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simply with the aim of enhancing ingroup identity and esteem) from “realistic 
competition” (forms of intergroup differentiation designed to enhance the material 
status of the ingroup relative to outgroups).  
 In the case of the political speeches that I am considering here, it is interesting 
to consider the forms of international differentiation that come into play when Vaz 
and Cook couple values of multiculturalism to the construct of British identity.  
Significantly, these speakers did not simply cast cultural diversity as a central and 
enduring aspect of British society. They also cast multiculturalism as a value and 
commodity that positively distinguished the British people from Others.  
 At the time that Vaz and Cook were making their speeches in support and 
celebration of British Multiculturalism, similar debates concerning the value of 
cultural diversity were taking place within most Western Democracies. At one stage, 
Cook alluded, somewhat in passing, to Canada and the USA as successful 
multicultural societies. However, neither he nor Vaz acknowledged the extent to 
which political discourse on multiculturalism in the UK was, at the time, drawing 
directly upon Canadian formulations. In particular, it is worth noting that Vaz and 
Cook were delivering their speeches shortly after the EU (2000) had selected the 
motto, Unity in Diversity, and the publication of the 1999 EC Millennium 
declaration10 which opened with the following statement:  
The Union’s citizens are bound together by common values such as freedom, tolerance, 
equality, solidarity and cultural diversity.’  
 
Despite the clear parallels between their own accounts of the multicultural ideal and 
                                                        10 The full text is available at: 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/ACFA4C.htm  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the EU formulation, and despite their assertion that a commitment to multiculturalism 
was in part necessarily in the light of Britain’s much closer involvement with Europe, 
both Vaz and Cook treated multiculturalism as distinctively British.  
 
Ethnic diversity as British exceptionalism  
  As I noted above, the accounts that Cook and Vaz formulated in favour of  
the poly-ethnic character of British society did not reject the ideology of ethnic 
nationalism per se. On the contrary, the crux of their arguments was that ideologies of 
cultural and racial purity are false specifically of Britain:    
Extract 21 (RC) 
 1 In the pre-industrial era, when transport and communications were    
 2  often easier by sea than by land, Britain was unusually open to    
 3  external influence; first through foreign invasion, then, after Britain    
 4  achieved naval supremacy, through commerce and imperial   
 5  expansion. It is not their purity that makes the British unique, but    
 6  the sheer pluralism of their ancestry.  
  
 Extract 21 is particularly interesting in view of the fact that Cook had earlier  
justified the UK’s membership of the EU on the grounds of the existence of a  
common European identity based on shared geography and history:  
Extract  22 (RC)  
 1 To deny that Britain is European is to deny both our geography and our  
 2  history. Our culture, our security, and our prosperity, are inseparable  
 3  from the continent of Europe.  
  
In extract 21, however, the idea that Britain (here equated with the territory of the  
contemporary UK State) had, in the past, been uniquely open to external influence  
involves a sense of absolute geographical distinctiveness, together with a strategic  
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bracketing of historical population flows throughout Europe as well as elsewhere  
across the globe (see extract 24 for a similar account).  Similarly, in extract 13, we 
may note how Vaz neglects to consider the non-continental imperial histories of the 
Dutch, Spanish and Portuguese, and overlooks the Roman occupation of any other 
European (or, for that matter, Asian or African) territories11  
We have already seen how, when treating multiculturalism as a timely and 
expedient political project, both Vaz and Cook alluded to historically emergent trans-
national forces, including globalisation (The global era has produced population 
movements of a breadth and richness without parallel in history, extract 11, lines 4-5) 
and the EU. It is, then, instructive to note that the same historical forces to which Vaz 
and Cook attributed British cultural diversity and the urgency of multiculturalism as a 
British political imperative, are seen in contrast to strengthen other countries’ 
indigenous national cultures. Extract 23 was taken from a stretch of talk during which 
Robin Cook was attempting to counter opposition to EU integration.  In the course of 
working up the argument that EU membership posed no threat to British identity, he 
mobilised the exemplary case of Ireland, and in so doing used the terms national 
identity and culture as synonyms: 
Extract  23 (RC) 
 
1 Ireland joined [the EU] at the same time as Britain. […]  The result has   
2 been a new assertiveness of national identity, and confidence in their   
3 culture. We can see that for ourselves in Britain through the new affection   
4 for Irish music and dance, and the attachment to Irish pubs.   
                                                        11 Again, it is instructive to note how the BNP’s explicitly racialized version of British identity is 
paradoxically more able to accommodate the idea of a pan-European experience based on a common 
geographical location and a common history.  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Note how Cook not only projected onto Ireland the kind of singular, indigenous 
national culture that he disclaimed on behalf of Britain, but also cast the strengthening 
of their Irish culture as a commodity for ourselves in Britain, who benefit in so far as 
we are able to consume these cultural forms as part of our multicultural experience. 
 
British branding of liberal values 
 We have already seen how Vaz and Cook both represented British 
multiculturalism as the instantiation of general liberal values such as progressive 
change, equality, tolerance and internationalism.  Consequently, in the process of 
constructing multiculturalism as a distinctively British condition, they also implied 
that the liberal values underpinning multiculturalism should be construed as 
distinctively British (cf. Laegaard, 2007). 
 Keith Vaz was addressing an EU audience in Vienna, and at the start of his 
speech he displayed a tactful concern to respect the different approaches adopted 
towards national integration adopted by governments in Austria and the UK:   
Extract 24 (KV) 
 1  Austria’s approach to multiculturalism, given our different histories and  
 2  geographical positions, is different from ours. You tend to focus more on  
 3 integration in the sense of assimilation. But it would be strange if we    
 4   viewed these issues in the same way.   
   
Despite this attempted to deflect potential charges of ethnocentrism by adopting a 
multi-subjective approach, treating differences in the views adopted in the UK and 
Austria as natural and inevitable (lines 3-4), Vaz also made it clear that the values he 
attributed to the British government are ultimately morally superior to those policies 
he attributed to the Austrian government. In extract 1 we saw Vaz treating fairness as 
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necessarily entailing government policy that not just assimilates people but celebrates 
people’s difference.  Consequently, to paraphrase a formulation from Meertens and 
Pettigrew (1997 p. 56), whilst Vaz did not treat the Austrian approach to integration 
as inferior to the British approach, he presented the British approach as superior to the 
Austrian.  
  More generally, we may note how Vaz and Cook presented multiculturalism, 
internationalism and even democracy not as general liberal values, or as pan-
European values, but as specifically and distinctively British virtues. Vaz, for 
example, described respect for human rights, tolerance, fair play and an outward 
approach to the world as core British values (see extract 5).  
 Again, it is interesting to note how the BNP version – in which respect for 
human rights, tolerance, fair play and so forth are attributed to the distinctive DNA of 
Western European Caucasians – is, for all its exclusionary character, paradoxically 
more open to the possibility that liberal democratic may not be uniquely British.   
 
British Multiculturalism and “realistic” international competition 
 In these speeches, the formulation of multiculturalism as a uniquely British 
virtue is not simply used to construct a distinctive corporate identity. There are also 
significant practical ramifications of this kind of representation.  
 First, this nationalization of multiculturalism involves a form of moral exclusion 
(Opotow, 1995).   Both Vaz and Cook tacitly equated the boundaries of ethical 
concern and legitimate political action (the whole of our society) with boundaries of 
the British State.  Hence, far from entailing the antithesis of insular nationalism, Vaz 
and Cook’s arguments against racially or culturally delimited forms of social 
inclusion were strictly delimited in their domain of application to the population of 
  30 
the UK. When Vaz described to his EU audience how diversity enriches our society 
and our lives he was using “our” to pertain specifically to Britain.  Similarly, when 
Cook described multiculturalism as a positive force for our economy and society, the 
pronominal our and the nominal economy and society did not refer to a generic 
category of humanity, or even to an imagined community of EU citizens, but 
specifically to Britain.  
 It could be argued that this delimitation of the realm within which multicultural 
policies are pursued in the interests of social justice and welfare involved a form of 
discrimination through omission (cf. Deutsch, 1995).  However, on occasions both 
Vaz and Cook quite explicitly advocated British Multiculturalism as a means by 
which to pursue the UK’s material interests in competition with those of other nations 
or States.  Cook, who was addressing a group of business people in London, used a 
three part list (cf. Jefferson, 1990) that justified the multicultural project with 
reference to British economic and military imperatives, our prosperity, our security, 
our influence (cf. Hay & Rosamond, 2002), casting the rest of the world as a potential 
threat or resource rather than a category of common identity or interest12. Later in his 
speech, Cook went on to cast cultural pluralism as a resource in an essentially 
competitive international arena (an immense asset [for]…our nation) and he enjoined 
his audience to appreciate the extent to which the existence of (by implication 
distinctive) ethnic diversity enhances the human capital of the Capital, such that 
London may be represented as the hub of the globe:  
Extract 25 (RC) 
1  Today’s London is a perfect hub of the globe. It is home to over 30 ethnic   
2  communities of at least 10,000 residents each. In this city tonight, over                                                          12 The representation of emergent global events and processes as constraints and opportunities for  
specifically British interests and policies is common to New Labour rhetoric  (Smith, 2000).  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3  300 languages will be spoken by families over their evening meal at home.  
4  This pluralism is not a burden we must reluctantly accept. It is an immense  
5 asset that contributes to the cultural and economic vitality of our nation.   
 
Imperial echos 
  In view of the fact that both Vaz and Cook advertised the essentially modern – 
and specifically Post-Imperial – character of their rebranded formulation of British 
identity, it is interesting to consider the parallels between the lines of argument that 
these speakers employed and the kinds of accounts of British cultural hybridity and 
diversity that were communicated to the British public in didactic texts between the 
Victorian era of Imperial expansion and the second world war.  
 
 Celebrating Anglo/British hybridity 
  Vaz’s and Cook’s narrative of the evolution of the British population from an 
amalgam of different peoples and cultures echoes earlier formulations of the English 
as a “mongrel race”, or, in Defoe’s (1703) words, “That het'rogeneous thing, an 
Englishman”.  Images of the Anglo British as an historical hybrid of different peoples 
was regularly employed in nineteenth century history texts produced for children, 
such as Dickens’s (1853) A Child’s History of England:  
  Little by little, strangers became mixed with the Islanders,  
  and the savage Britons grew into a wild, bold people (p.8).  
  
  The idea of historically-evolved national cultural hybridity could be used to 
support a range of rhetorical projects. Defoe’s own references to the “het’rogeneous” 
heritage of the population of England were being used to parody contemporary forms 
of anti-French sentiment based on appeals to a supposedly distinctive and enduring 
English character. In the nineteenth century, images of national diversity and 
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hybridity were used to positively differentiate England and the English people from 
nations whose claims to identity emphasized the existence of cultural homogeneity (as 
was emerging in France) or a common genetic “stock” (as was emerging in Germany) 
(Young, 1995).  
  In the first half of the twentieth century, images of Anglo/British ancestral  
and cultural hybridity and territorial diversity were still current. The example below, 
taken from Dixon’s book The Englishman published in 1938, has evident parallels 
with the kind of account presented above (e.g. extract 21) in which contemporary 
politicians celebrate the uniquely plural ancestry of the population of the UK:  
  The island, the geographical unit, bound its inhabitants  
  together, made of the various tribes a common people, a group,  
  a community, and finally a nation, living and working together  
  to common ends. This, then, is England’s peculiarity, a firm  
  island unity imposed upon and embracing the most extreme  
  racial variety anywhere to be found within such limits in all  
  the world. (p. 101).   
 
  By the nineteen thirties, this type of representation was not being used to cast 
Anglo British chauvinism as fundamentally irrational, nor simply to present “our” 
nation as superior to others (although such arguments were still current). 
Significantly, in the run-up to the second world war, arguments concerning national 
racial and cultural diversity were also inclined to be granted a quasi-universal status, 
in a manner which contrasts markedly with their use by Vaz and by Cook at the start 
of the twenty-first century. Although contemporary authors pointed to the peculiarity 
of the Anglo British condition of cultural hybridity and diversity, the difference 
between “our” country and others could be treated as one of degree rather than kind. 
For example, Dixon noted that:     
 The peoples and races we know, the inhabitants of the world  
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  today, are without exception, mixed races and peoples (p. 19)  
  
Unlike Vaz and Cook, Dixon specifically emphasized how the especial diversity of 
England and the English represented part and parcel of a more generic, pan-  
European, condition:  
  Overlook this ethnic complex and we shall certainly be at a  
  loss to understand England and the English. It has been said  
  of Europe in general, and particularly of Western Europe, that  
  it constituted a cul-de-sac, in which masses of immigrants  
  succeeded or were heaped upon each other. So with our own  
  country (p. 88)  
  
Unlike Vaz and Cook, Dixon also suggested that the Angles and Saxons were not an 
ethnically singular or indigenous people.  This is not, of course, to say that Dixon’s 
account of the fictive nature of all appeals to ethnic nationalism was devoid of 
connotations of Anglo British chauvinism. On the contrary the very act of flagging an 
awareness of the racially and culturally diverse heritages of national populations was 
clearly designed to display the comparative moral and intellectual superiority of 
Anglo British consciousness over the irredentist politics of Nazi Germany.   
   
Celebrating British Imperial cultural diversity  
  In extract 2 Keith Vaz presented Imperial constructions of British  
identity as comparatively narrow, and as racially and culturally exclusive. Although  
this kind of representation is commonly found in lay historiography (Condor, 2006), 
Imperial Britain was in fact typically valorized as a multi-racial and multi-  
cultural as well as a multi-national, polity. In fact, it is only since the break-up of the  
Empire (and the substitution of the legal status of British imperial subject with that of 
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British State citizen) that increasingly restrictive bureaucratic criteria of membership  
have come to be formulated.   
 Favell (1998) noted how concerns on the part of successive UK  
governments over the value of a racially and culturally neutral understanding of 
Britishness within the domestic sphere may be traced to the distinctive strategies of 
British Imperial governance, and in particular to the policy of indirect rule whereby 
colonial governance was effected by bolstering indigenous cultures and supporting 
indigenous rulers.  A good deal of the self-celebratory rhetoric of British Imperialism 
emphasized the moral, aesthetic, economic and military advantages of a multi-racial 
polity characterized by seeming infinite cultural variety (Cannadine, 2001). Examples 
of the valorization of the racial and cultural diversity of the Empire’s subjects may 
readily be identified in didactic texts, as illustrated by the following extract from 
Newland and Donald’s (1923) school primer, The Model Citizen:  
 The British Empire is one of the marvels of the world […] a  
  dominion composed of widely scattered parts, separated by […]  
  differences of religion, customs, traditions, race, and colour;  
  and yet united under one king, one flag, and one empire. This  
  vast domain, more than eleven millions of square miles in  
  extent, has been built up by the pluck, enterprise, and tact of  
  our forefathers, and it has been handed down to us as a  
 heritage of which we are rightly proud’ (p. 185).  
   
 We have seen how Robin Cook in 2001 used references to statistical facts to  
emphasize the extent and distinctiveness of UK ethnic diversity. Similarly, the  
cultural and racial diversity of the populations of British Imperial possessions was  
frequently calibrated for rhetorical effect. The following extract from Cooper’s (1921) 
text for children, How the Empire Grew, is notably similar to Robin Cook’s  
metropolitan version of London as the hub of the globe:  
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  In this empire of ours there are nearly as many blacks as there  
  are whites, and three times as many browns … the British empire  
 includes as many Chinese as there are in Peking, and six times  
  as many Arabs as there are in all Arabia (p. 132).   
 
  I noted above how Keith Vaz implicitly treated UK government policies of  
multiculturalism as superior to the strategies of social integration used in many other  
EU member States, which just assimilat[e] people.  It is interesting, then, to note that 
during the age of Imperialism, authors regularly asserted the superiority of the British 
policy of indirect rule as compared to the French Imperial policy that “just” involved 
the cultural assimilation of subject peoples. In the following extract, Newland and 
Donald (1923, p. 205) are stressing how British subjects of French origin benefited 
from the comparatively liberal form of British imperial governance:  
  When the English conquered Quebec, they did not inflict  
 indignity upon the vanquished people by imposing upon them  
  another language and another religion. They not only left the  
  French all the liberty which they had previously enjoyed, but  
  gave them more.   
 
 Just as contemporary politicians may conceal their celebratory accounts of the 
superiority of the form of citizenship adopted in the UK beneath a tactful recognition 
of national differences, Newland and Donald (p. 238) encouraged their young readers 
to display the British virtue of tact when faced with alternative forms of citizenship 
characteristic of less fortunate or enlightened foreigners:  
 There are people in every land who love freedom and justice,  
 who have their citizen rights and perform their citizen duties,  
  although such rights and duties may not be so many or quite the  
  same as ours. We should always remember, then, to do justice to  
 foreigners, as we should like them to do justice to us.    
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Concluding Comments 
    
 In this chapter I have considered some of the rhetorical strategies used by UK 
politicians advocating a contemporary, civic version of Britain as “multicultural 
society” in contrast to an imagined outdated, Anglocentric, ethnic nationalist 
alternative.  Close analysis of the text of these speeches suggested that the ability of 
the speakers to maintain their initial line of reasoning was in practice constrained by 
their adoption of a banal nationalist frame of reference. In both of the speeches that I 
considered, the speakers invoked images of British exceptionalism, which rested on 
the tacit presumption that societies, virtues, races and cultures normally come neatly 
and unambiguously packaged within the boundaries of distinct nation-states.  In 
constructing progressive narratives of the development of Britain as an essentially and 
distinctively multicultural society, both speakers employed tacitly Anglocentric forms 
of historiography, designed in particular to positively differentiate their own country 
from other European nations and States. Paradoxically, the speakers’ supposedly post-
colonial re-formulations of British society and identity as composed of a diverse 
people enjoying the material, aesthetic and moral advantages of a multi-racial, 
multicultural polity, in practice closely echoed the very discourses of British Imperial 
governance which the speakers claimed to be supplanting.  
 In their accounts, both politicians equated multicultural (“inclusive”) domestic 
policies with a commitment to internationalism, thereby presenting their own position 
as the exemplification of what Billig (1995 p. 49) termed “reasonable … point-zero 
nationalism”.  In practice, however, the global context in which the speakers located 
their new, improved, version of British identity was not a world of universal human 
rights, nor a cosmopolitan world of trans-national cultures, nor even the more 
circumscribed political universe of the European Union. Rather, their imagined world 
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comprised a hierarchical “order of nations” (cf. Spurr, 2001), in the context of which 
British Multiculturalism was treated both as evidence of “our” distinctive liberal 
virtue, and as strategically advantageous for the pursuit of “our” (specifically 
national) interests.  
 Clearly, it could be argued that, as British Government ministers, the 
politicians whose speeches I have been considering were working with a severely 
restricted rhetorical remit.  It is, then, instructive to note how the normative 
nationalization of multicultural values can also be identified amongst social actors 
who are not operating under the same kinds of institutional constraints. For example, 
Asari et al. (2008, p. 2) have recently asserted that “a strong national identity … is a 
prerequisite to a stable and functioning multicultural society”.  The problem is that 
arguments in favour of a specifically national (for example British) multiculturalism 
may do nothing to challenge ethnic nationalism as a general ideology.  Moreover, in 
so far as multiculturalism is cast as an inherent, distinctive and valued aspect of any 
specific national or state identity, the politics of multiculturalism may in practice be 
functionally antithetical to the development of cosmopolitan social and political 
solidarities.  
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